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Abstract 
Blood testing for hereditary factors is being used increasingly in 
paternity cases to infer that a particular man is the father. Geneticists 
calculate a probability of patemity using Bayes's theorem, making various 
assumptions about the genetic factors used and the other evidence in the 
case. These assumptions are criticized and the role of Bayes's theorem in 
a legal setting is discussed. The role of the forensic statistician in 
helping a court combine quantitative genetic evidence with nongenetic 
evidence is described. The effects of statistical errors and laboratory 
errors are discussed. 
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i §1. Introduction 
There are two important kinds of evidence in cases of disputed 
paternity: blood tests for hereditary factors and testimony 
concerning sexual intercourse between the mother and alleged 
father. If blood tests exclude an alleged father then the case 
usually proceeds no further. If an alleged father is not excluded 
then the question of sexual intercourse becomes central. In 
many courts the particulars of blood tests play an increasingly 
important role in this setting. 
Given the genetic makeup of parents, that of an offspring 
has a particular probability distribution. The problem of 
inference in cases of disputed paternity is to decide which genetic 
structure produced a given result. So it is a typical problem 
in statistical inference. 
The basic statistical tool for problems involving "inverse 
probabilities" is Bayes's theorem. While its use for scientific 
inference is controversial among statisticians, it has been readily 
adopted by geneticists for purposes of_ genetic counseling and by some 
in cases of disputed patemity. Its application will be discussed in 
Sections 3 and 4. The approach we describe is used by many authors 
and, in particular, Salmon and Salmon (1980). 
The procedure followed varies considerably from one laboratory to 
another. The following is a scenario that some facilities follow in 
obtaining and reporting results of blood tests. First, a blood sample 
is taken from the alleged father. At the same time he is identified 
and photographed; his thumbprint may be taken. When the samples are 
drawn from the mother and child, the mother is asked to verify that 
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the man in the photograph is indeed the alleged father. 
The child, mother,-and alleged father are compared with respect 
to various blood group genetic systems. The systems chosen vary; 
greatly from one laboratory to another, and we have records of cases 
which show that different systems can be chosen by the same laboratory. 
Most states employ tissue-typing for human leukocyte antigen (HLA). 
This latter possibility will be discussed in Section 6, but our ex-
amples deal with red blood cell antigens and enzymes and serum proteins. 
The testing laboratory prepares a report with its findings. 
This report (which is similar to Table 9 in Section 4) lists 
the various blood factors tested and gives measures of "likelihood 
of paternity". A main purpose of this paper is to elucidate and 
critically examine the assumptions and ensuing calculations in 
such a report. This is done in Sections 4 and 5. · Another purpose 
is to describe an appropriate method of presentation for quanti-
tative evidence in the presence of other kinds of evidence. 
The focus of this article is the role of the forensic statist-
cian in paternity cases, particuiarly as it applies to educating 
lawyers and communicating with juries. This role revolves around 
the use of Bayes'stheorem: How are likelihoods calculated? Are 
blood group factors and other genetic polymorphisms independent? 
What is the eff.ect of classification errors? How are prior 
probabilities assessed and interpreted? How should nongenetic 
evidence be combined with genetic polymorphisms? What are 
appropriate reference populations? The paper is written mainly 
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for statisticians but the discussion is kept at a level appro-
priate for many nonstatisticians. Some of the ideas and 
criticisms of the usual approac·h are similar to those of Ellman and 
Kaye (1979) and Aickin and Kay (1982). 
A short summa~y of the necessary genetical background is 
given in Section 2. The interested reader is referred to Elandt-
Johnson (1971) for a much more extensive presentation. 
§2. Background Genetics 
Until recently, genetic testing was used in paternity suits 
to exclude an alleged father. If the testing procedure did not 
exclude it was regarded as largely irrelevant. These tests involved 
mainly the red cell antigens of the blood. 
These antigens are inherited substances present on the surface 
of the cells that have the capacity to induce the production of 
other substances termed antibodies. Antibodies in turn react with 
antigens; it is assumed that the serum of an individual in which 
the red blood cells ~re suspended, does not possess nor can produce 
antibodies against its own antigens. So a blood group system is a 
property of the individual's serum by which the antigen is recognized. 
Consider a hypothetical system, say GH. An individual having 
blood group G then will not produce anti-G (antibody) but can possess 
or produce anti-H, say, an antibody to an alternative blood factor 
H belonging to the same system. A battery of diagnostic tests are 
available to determine an individual's blood group. 
The logical basis for an exclusionary result depends on a 
relatively simple·genetic construct. An individual's genotype, or 
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hereditary configuration, for a particular inherited antigen con-
sists of two out of a number of alternative forms of the heredi~.- · 
tary unit, called alleles, one £rom each parent. For example, for 
the simplest system with only two possible alleles, say, G and H, 
an individual's genotype will be one of GG, GH, and H:H. If the 
parents are GG and HH then all offspring must be GH, a G from the 
first parent and an H from the second. On the other hand, if both 
parents are GB then the child can be any of the three genotypes. 
Since each child inherits one of its two letters (alleles) from 
each parent, certain men can be logically excluded if the mother's 
and child's genotypes are known. Table 1 lists these exclusions. 
No alleged father of genotype GB can be logically excluded under 
any genotypic combination of mother and child. 
Table 1: GB Paternal Exclusion 
Child's Mother's Excluded 
Genot;me Genotne Father's GenotIEe 
GG GG BH 
GB GG GG 
BH GG Mother excluded! 
GG GB HH 
GB GB None 
HH GH GG 
GG BB Mother excluded! 
GB HH BH 
HH BB GG 
When the alleles are codominant, as in the MN red cell antigen 
case, it is possible to establish the genotype of any subject. 
When one allele dominates another it is only possible for the 
test to establish the phenotype--the physical expression of a 
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genotype which may be influenced by environmental conditions, in this 
case the presence or absence of the dominant allele. 
The ABO red blood antigen system is basically a three allele 
system (though modern methods are able to discern at least two 
variants of the A allele, A1 and A2). It is a mixed system 
since A and B are codominant and both dominate 0. Hence an 
individual whose phenotype is A has genotype either AO or AA; 
simil~rly for B. However, the phenotype of the codominant case 
AB and also that of the recessive case O completely determine 
the corresponding genotypes AB and,, 00. 
1 As an example consider the following ·phenotypic frequencies 
for the ABO system in a sample of n = 6004 white Ca.lifomians reported 
by Grunbaum, et al. (1978): 
n = 2891, 0 nA = 2149, nB = 724, nAB = 240. 
Let p0, PA, PB' PAB be the population phenotypic relative 
frequencies and g0, gA' gB the allelic frequencies. Then using 
2 
the Hardy-Weinberg law: 
it follows that 
1 They actually report relative frequencies to three decimals--the 
frequencies we give are approximated from their figures. 
2 This law depends on the assumption of random mating which, strictly 
speaking, assigns to each individual of one sex in a population an 
equal chance of being a partner to a given mate of the opposite sex 
which is interpreted as a mating between unrelated individuals. 
The transmission of the inherited units, one from each parent, is 
then presumed to be statistically independent of the particular 
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PA - 8A + 28o8A 
2 
PB -= 8B. + 28o8B 
One estimate of p0 is n0/n and in turn g0 can be estimated to 
be I n0/n. But these estimates are not efficient. Asuuming the 
sample is random, the likelihood function of g0 , gA, gB (where 
g0 + gA + gB = 1) is proportional to 
Methods for numerically determining the maximum likelihood estimates 
of the various allelic, genotypic, and phenotypic frequencies 
are readily available; c.f. El~ndt-Johnson (1971). The maximum 
likelihood estimates of the allelic relative frequencies for the 
A A A 
above data are g0 = 0.692, gA = 0.224, and gB ~ 0.084. 
The corresponding estimates of genotypic and phenotypic relative 
frequencies are given in Table 2. (These pbenotypic estimates 
differ from those of Grunbaum, et al. (1978) who apparently 
used maximum likelihood estimates for the allelic frequencies 
but the sample proportions for the phenotypic frequencies.) 
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Table 2: ABO System Proportions 
(Estimates for a White California Population) 
Phenotype 0 A B AB 





28A8B Genotypic Bo gA gB Frequency (0.479: (0.310) · (0.050) (0.116: (0.007) 0.038 
Phenotypic 
0.479 Frequency 0.360 0.123 0.038 
Logical phenotypic exclusions for the ABO system are given 
in Table 3. This table also gives estimates of the proportion 
of men who are excluded from paternity on the basis of ABO 
blood type. 
Table 3: ABO System Paternal Exclusion 
Child's Mother's Excluded Paternal Proportion of Estimate for 
Phenotne Phenotue Phenotfi!eS Excluded Males White Californians 
0 0 AB PAB 0.038 
A 0 O, B Po~ PB 0.062 
B 0 O, A Po+. PA 0.839 
AB 0 Mother excluded! 
0 A AB PAB 0.038 
A A None 0 0.000 
B A O, A Po+ PA 0.839 
AB A O, A Po+ PA 0.839 
0 B AB PAB 0.038 
A B O, B Po+ ~B 0.602 
B B None 0 0.000 
AB B O, B Po+ PB 0.602 
0 AB Mother excluded! 
A AB None 0 0.000 
B AB None 0 0.000 
AB AB 0 Po 0.479 
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The estimated probability of exclusion for the ABO system 
in a white population is the average of these estimates. This 
average is with re~pect to the probabilities of the various 
child/mother phenotype combinations. These are given in Table 4. 
3 For example, for "child: O; mother: O" the calculation of g0 
2 proceeds as follows: The probability of "mother: O" is g0; 
if the mother is O the child inherits an O allele from her, 
the probability that the other allele is O is simply g0 • For 
the population of white Californians the estimated probability 
of exclusion on the basis of ABO is 0.181. · Salmon and Salmon 
(1980) suggest that only systems with high exclusion probability 
be used in paternity cases. There are many known systems of red 
cell antigens.: The first syst~m for exclusion of paternity based 
on blood group evidence was used more than 40 years ago, although 
early tests were only used to exclude putative fathers. As the 
number of red blood groups used· in such tests increased it was 
realized that continual nonexclusion enhances the possibility of 
paternity. As still other genetic polymorphic (multiple allelic 
forms) systems, including serum protein groups and white cell anti-
gens such as human leukocyte antigen (HLA), were introduced into 
thin legal enterprise, systematic efforts were made to determine 
a canonical measure of the "likelihood of paternity" of an alleged 
father. In many European and U.S. courts it has now become standard 
practice to accept genetic evidence in terms of a "probability" 
that an alleged father is indeed the father. This concept is 
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§3. From Evidence to Inference 
Either an alleged father is the true father or not, and 
a court may ultimately be called on to render a verdict. If 
genetic testing excludes the man then, barring a gene mutation 
and errors in testing and transcribing, he is not the father. 
(fresumably a modern court would reach a conclusion different 
from the one that decided against Charlie Chaplin in a famous 
case3 from the 1940's~) If the man is not excluded the~ the evidence 
is not decisive--one possibility is to quantify "degree of paternity": 
How likely is it that the man is the father on the basis of the 
quantitative evidence? Such questions are statistical in nature 
and can be addressed by either Bayesian or classical methods. 
The Bayesian approach is ideal for this problem in the sense 
that Bayes' s theorem gives the relation between "inverse probabilities": 
the probability of guilt given evidence and the probability of 
evidence given guilt. The usual objection to a Bayesian approach 
is that the decision maker must assess prior information before, 
or independently from,the evidence at hand. This in turn leads to 
a subjective interpretation of probability. There is a natural 
"subject" or "decision maker" when a patemity case is brought to court: 
the individual juror (or the judge in non-jury trials). The ability 
(or willingness!) of a juror to make a probability assessment is 
another matter--this will be discussed in Section 5. 
The problem of disputed paternity can also be addressed from 
3 Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 664-65, 169 P. 2d 442, 
450-451 (1946). 
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a classical hypothesis testing point of view. The null ~ypothesis 
is that the alleged father is the father and the alternative is that 
he is not. A test based on a series of blood·group determinations 
that rejects the null only when the alleged father is excluded 
has significance level O but indeterminate power. (Any other 
nonrandomized test with a<l will be arbitrary and difficult to 
describe. Randomized tests are inappropriate in this and similar 
contexts and would be disallowed by courts-see Section 5 for re-
lated discussion.) There is no natural alternative (unless there 
are two potential fathers, with the blood types of both available) 
at which to evaluate power, and averaging power over the population 
seems reasonable. This of course is a Bayesian notion. To our 
knowledge classical approaches have not been used in paternity 
cases. The remainder of this article deals with the Bayesian 
approach. 
Bayes's Theorem 
Bayes's theorem is an immediate consequence of the definition 
of conditional probability. Stated simply, it ~ays that the 
probability of a statement being true given some new evidence 
E is proportional to the probability that it was considered 
true before obtaining E, times the probability that E would 
obtain if the statement were true. 
For example, we suspect that a coin that has just been tossed 
five times yielding five heads is not a fair coin. The probability 
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that a fair coin would show five heads in any five independent 
tosses is 1/32. There is a nonsensical tendency among naive 
users of significance tests to say that 1/32 is the probability 
that the coin is a fair coin. The probability that the coin is 
fair is of course related to the evidence at hand, but the problem 
cannot be addressed unless alternative hypotheses are specified. 
Suppose that prior to tossing a coin we consider it to be fair with 
probability 0.95 and, say, two-headed with probability_0.05. 
Given the new evidence, the probability that the coin is fair is 
proportional tQ (0.95)(1/32) and the probability that the coin is 
two-headed is proportional to (0.05)(1); since the corresponding -
probabilities must sum to 1 they are approximately 0.37 and 0.63, 
changed from 0.95 and 0.05. The output of Bayes's theorem is a 
"posterior" probability assessment of the truth of the opposing 
statements--posterior to the new evidence. 
This example is obviously simplistic. There is seldom a 
single clear-cut alternative (such as "two-headed coin") to the 
statement under consideration. It is unlikely in a legal case 
that all parties would agree that one of two particular people is 
guilty. Usually there are a large number of alternatives. The 
probability of obtaining E, the evidence at hand, must be assessed 
under each alternative. In addition, the probability of each of the 
possible alternatives must be assessed. 
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Let s1 , s2, ••• stand for the possible true statements and 
Pr(S1) the prior probability of Si. The likelihood of Si on the 
basis of evidence E is Pr(Elsi). Then the posterior probability 
of Si is given by Bayes's theorem: 
Pr(SilE) = Pr(Elsi)•Pr(Si)/K 
The constant K is determined by the requirement that the total 
probability is 1: 
K = Pr(E) c Pr(Elsi)•Pr(s1) + Pr(Els2)•Pr(S2) + ..• 
An Example 
To illustrate with a case of disputed paternity and very simple 
genetic evidence, consider ABO system phenotypes for white Californians 
discussed by Grunbaum, et al. (1978),with frequencies given in 
Table 2. The least complicated application of Bayes's theorem is 
for a set of possible fathers with their phenotypes given (a more 
realistic assumption will be made in the next section). 
Six men (Mr. 1, ••• , Mr. 6) are the only possibilities as the 
father of the child in question and they are deemed equally likely 
on the basis of other evidence. That is, Pr(Si) = 1/6 where Si is 
the statement "Mr. i is the child's father." Evidence E consists 
of the blood type information given in Table 5. The problem is to 
incorporate this new evidence. 
Table 5: Evidence E -- ABO system 
Person Chil" Mother Mr. 1 Mr. 2 Mr. 3 Mr. 4 Mr. 5 Mr. 6 
Phenotype 0 0 0 A B AB 0 A 
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Since parental genotypes AB .and 00 cannot produce a type 0 
child, Pr(E(s4) = O. Since type O crossed with type O always gives 
rise to type O, 
The other likelihoods are complicated by the fact that the genotypes 
of types A and B are not known. Consider s2, or equivalently, s6• 
If Mr. 2 is the father then he must be genotype AO--this has probability 
2g0gA/pA = 31/36 given he is type A. Further, the probability of AO 
(father) and 00 (mother) giving rise to type O (child) is 1/2: the 
child is type O if and only if the father's O allele is passed 
on. So 
Pr(E I s2) = ~ • -~! = 0.431. 
Similarly, 
The value of K is 0.556. The required likelihoods and posterio~ 
probabilities are given in Table 6. 
Table 6: From Prior to Posterior via Evidence E 
Statement : s1 s2 s3 s4 S5 s6 
Probability 1(6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 Prior to E 
Likelihood: 
Pr(Elsi) 1 0.431 0.472 0 1 0.431 
Probability 0.300 0.129 0.141 0 0.300 0.129 Posterior to E 
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Among the six candidates, only Mr. 4 is exonerated by the evidence. 
Every other man with type AB would also be ::.exonerated. On the other 
hand, men with type O have the highest likelihood. 
Now suppose new evidence E' involving the Ge serum protein system 
is introduced. For the same population, estimates of the frequencies of 
alleles 1 and 2 are 0.710 and 0.290 (Grunbaum, et al. 1978). Since 
these are codominant, the genotypic frequencies are the same as the 
phenotypic frequencies; these are 0.504, 0.084, 0.412 for genotypes 
11, 22, 12 respectively. Evidence E' is given in Table 7. 
Table 7: Evidence E' - Ge System 
Person Child Mother Mr. 1 Mr. 2 Mr. 3 Mr. 4 Mr. 5 Mr. 6 
Phenotype 12 11 22 12 12 12 11 11 
Assuming E' and E are independent, Bayes's theorem can be applied 
again. The likelihoods of the Si for these new data are given in Table 8 
along with the probabilities posterior to both E' and E. 
Table 8: From Posterior to E to Posterior to E' 
Statement s1 s2 s3 s4 ss s~ 
Probability 0.300 0.129 0.141 0 0.300 0.129 Prior to E' 
llfl 
Likelihood: 1 1/2 1/2 1/2 Pr(E'js1) 0 0 
Probability 0.690 0.148 0.162 0 0 0 Posterior to E' 
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The value of K, the probability of E' given E, is 0.435. Mr. 5 and 
Mr. 6 are now exonerated and, of course, Mr. 4 is still excluded. 
As more genetic systems are included, more potential fathers are 
eliminated, and-. the .probability of paternity for those not excluded 
tends to increase. 
The way in which Bayes' s theorem is applied in many courts is presented 
in the next section, which can properly be regarded as an extension of 
this section. This application will be discussed and carefully scrutinized 
in the next section and, especially, in the subsequent section. 
§4. Current Use of Blood Testing in Law 
The example in the previous section is not very realistic. First, 
it is unusual for all possible candidates to be known with certainty--
mothers conceal the number of possible fathers in at least 48% of paternity 
cases (Arthur and Reid 1954). Second, many more genetic polymorphisms 
than that provided by the ABO and Ge systems are available. We shall 
reconsider the example of the previous section making the more realistic 
assumption that one man, say Mr. 1, has been accused of being the child's 
father. For expository purposes we shall consider only evidence from 
the ABO system. 
Likelihood Ratios and Prior Odds 
C Let Si continu~ to stand for "Mr. i is the father" and let s1 be 
the complement of s1• Mr. 1 plays a central role in the current discussion 




Rewriting Bayes's theore~, 
Pr(Sl) Pr(E s1) -1 
[ 
c ( c ] 
Pr(S1IE) c 1 + Pr{S1) "pr(EjSl) . 
C 
where the "likelihood" of s 1 is 
Pr(E(s1c) = ~ Pr(Ets.) Pr(s.ts1c), i>2 1 1 
really an average or integrated likelihood. Expressed equivalently, 
Pr(s1c(E) 
Pr(s11E) 
C I C Pr(Sl ) Pr(E s1 ) • 
= Pr ( S 1) ·• Pr (E I S 1) · ' 
the posterior odds ratio is the product of the prior odds ratio and the , 
likelihood ratio. 
Evidence Eis the child's, mother's, and alleged father's ABO system 
blood types. The likelihood of Si depends on Mr. i's blood type and is 
given as in the previous section. It may be appropriate to restrict 
laboratories from supplying any more than the various Pr(E(S.) to court. 
l. 
But the current practice of many laboratories goes further, and their 
calculations are usually admitted--if not well understood! 
First, it is assumed that the true father is a randomly selected man 
from some population (we'll return to this in Chapter 5) if the alleged 
father is not the father. Since all men with the s~ genotype have the 
same likelihood and conditional (on s1c) prior probability, they can be 
grouped together. The conditional prior probability of each group is the 
proportion of the corresponding genotype in the population. So 
Pr(E(s1c) = g0
2 Pr(E(Father is 00) + 2g0gAPr{E(Father is AO) 
+ gA2 Pr(E(Father is AA)+ 2g0gBPr(E(Father is BO) 
2 . 
+ gB Pr(EIFather is BB)+ 2gAgBPr(E(Father is AB) 
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In the example of the previous section in which both mother and child 
are type 0, there is a much easier route. Namely, this evidence will 
result if and only if an 0 allele is selected (randomly) from the 
population; so P(Els1c) c g0 , or about 0.692 in the example. 
The above assumption is innocuous when compared to the next one! 
Suppose that Mr. 1 and one other man of unknown blood type· are equally 
C likely to be the father; that is, Pr(s1) = Pr(s1 ) = 0.5. Then the 
posterior odds equal the likelihood ratio. If, as in Secion 3, Mr. 1 is 
type 0 then 
Pr(s1jE) = l + ~. 692 = 0.591, 
increased somewhat from the prior probability since Mr. 1 is in a group 
of men--those with type 0--who have the highest likelihood. 
The inverse of the above likelihood ratio, Pr(Els1)/Pr(EJs1c), plays 
an important role in some courtroom presentations. It is called the 
paternity index, or P.I., by Salmon and Salmon (1980). The higher the 
paternity index the greater the relative likelihood of s1• 
One problem with converting a paternity index into a probability via 
Bayes~ theorem is assessing the prior probability Pr(S1}. It is artificial 
to suppose, as we essentially did above, that exactly two men, including 
the alleged father, had intercourse with the mother near the time of 
conception, each the same number of times. The number of men who could be 
the father is usually a point of contention between the two sides. Another 
point pf contention may be whether intercourse with the alleged father ever 
took place, or if it did, the timi_ng of such intercourse relative to the 
child's birthdate. 
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The other problem with this paternity index is that it assumes a 
"random man" is the alternative to the alleged father. The question is, 
random from what population? Averaging with respect to different relative 
frequencies to obtain the likelihood Pr(E(s1c) can substantially affect it. 
These two issues are related; both will be returned to in Section 5. 
Likelihoods for Multiple Gene Systems: Independence 
In the above example, suppose the Ge phenotypes of child, mother, and 
Mr. 1 are known to be 12, 11, and 22, respectively; call this evidence 
E'. Now the likelihood of s1 for E' is 
Assuming that the true father is selected randomly from the hypothesized 
population when s 1 is false implies that the (average) likelihood of s 1c for 
E' is 
Pr(E' (s1c) c s12 Pr(E' !Father is 11) + 2g1g2Pr(E' !Father is 12) 
2 + g2 Pr(E'(Father is 22). 
Again the analysis is simpler. Evidence E' obtains when a 2 allele is 
selected randomly from the population; this has probability g2 ,:::, 0.290. 
Hence, using probabilities posterior to E as prior to E', 
Pr(S1IE,E') = 1 + 0.290~ 0.409 = 0.833. 
1 0.591 





Bringing more and more evidence.to bear in this way will tend to 
increase the posterior probability of Mr. 1 if he (or his identical twi~!) 
is the father and tend to decrease it--perhaps make it 0--if he is not. 
This repeated application of Bayes's theorem is not only appropriate for 
blood test data or other genetic polymorphisms but applies whenever infor-
mation can be quantified using probabilities. But there is a proviso. 
It would be incorrect to use the same data twice. More generally, the 
individual pieces of information should be independent. 
Instead of applying equation (1) for E and then for E', a more 
direct path, in terms of odds,_ is as follows: 
Pr(Els/) Pr(s1clE,E') 
Pr(s11E,E') = Pr(E I s 1) • 
Pr(E' 1st> 
Pr(E' I s1) • 
The "paternity index" is now 
,. 
the product of individual likelihood ratios. Multiplication of probabilities 
is appropriate only if E and E' are statistically independent. For 
example, it must be that frequencies 0.504, 0.084, 0.412 for Ge phenotypes 
11, 22, 12 hold for each blood type. If almost every type O has Gc-22, 
say, then the above calculations are inappropriate. Bayes~ theorem would 
still apply, but the ABO and Ge systems would have to be considered 




In paternity cases, calculations of an index and the posterior 
probability of paternity assume independence of the blood factors tested. 
4 There is some justification for this assumption. Grunbaum, et al. (1978) 
present data for over 10,000 individuals to show that 12 factors--including 
ABO and Gc--are either pairwise independent or, perhaps, negligibly depen-
dent. While pairwise independence is weaker than independence, this 
result does lend credence to a calculation in which likelihoods for 
these 12 factors are multiplied. 
A hypothetical example is shown in Table 9. None of the tests excludes 
the alleged father. Estimates of genetic frequencies for a white and a 
black California population were taken from Grunbaum, et al. (1978). (The 
appropriate "population" to be used is that of the true father, not that of 
the alleged father, as used by all laboratories we know about-see Section 
5.) For certain factors these frequencies vary considerably by·race. In 
this case the paternity index is 65 times larger in the black population 
than in the white one! Obviously, some of these blood factors are 
racially dependent. 
Table 9: Gene System Likelihood Ratios; White vs. Black 
Gene System Child Mother Mr. 1 Likelihood Ratio Likelihood Ratio 
(White) (Black) 
ABO 0 0 0 0.692 0.690 
Rhesus 0.208 0.074 
PGM 11 11 12 1.534 1.619 
AK 12 11 22 0.037 0.008 
ADA 11 11 12 1.898 1.796 
EAP AA CA BA 0.670 0.428 
EsD 12 12 12 1.807 1.840 
G-6-PD B B B 0.995 0.730 
Hb A A A 0.999 0.956 
Hp 12 12 12 1.507 1.517 
Ge 12 11 22 0.290 0.129 
PGD A A A 0.981 0.964 
Product 8.00 X 10-J 1.23 X 10-4 
Paternity Index (=I/Product) 125 8100 
"Plausibility of Paternity" 
(cl/(1 + Product)) 99.2% 99.99% 
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Footnote for page 21 
4
we have heard indirectly from several geneticists and pathologists who 
claim that i:this is not an assumption, but a fact. Indeed, it is standard 
practice to assume independence of genetic polymorphisms in legal settings 
without stating the assumption. For example, the two volume work by 
Schatkin (1984) never mentions it as an assumption though hundreds of 
genetics articles are referenced. Also,· Schatkin (1984, Chs. 5 to 9) 
cites many experts who casually multiply probabilities for up to 100 
genetic polymorphisms (not all of which are specified), assuming indepen4 · .. •. 
dence without saying so.· We are not convinced! 
21A 
"Plausibility of paternity" is also given in the table. Although the 
black paternity index is 65 times that of the white, both plausibilities 
are close to 1. (Schatkin (1984, p. 8-37)) cites a case in which the 
"plausibility of paternity" is 98.5% when the reference population is 
white and 54% when it is black.) This term is used by some to mean the 
posterior probability of paternity assuming the prior probability, PR(S1), 
is 0.5 and the true father is selected randomly from the population if s1 
is false. While the term is misleading, it is better than the alternatives 
which are also used: "probability of paternity" and "likelihood of patemity:~n 
.Some laboratories take the liberty of transforming this "plausibili~y 
of paternity" into an assessment of the truth of the ultimate question by 
providing Hwmnel's6 Likelihood of Patern~ty given in Table 10. 
Table 10: Hummel's Likelihood of Paternity 
Plausibility 
of Paternity 
0.9980 - 0.9990 
0.9910 - 0.9979 
0.9500 0.9909 
o .• 9000 - 0. 9499 
0.8000 - 0.8999 









In practice, factors are tested that are not among the 12 given in 
Table 9. But if additional factors cannot be shown to be independent 
of all other factors tested, their use in calculating these indices should 
be criticized and should be disallowed in court (unless they serve to 
exclude a putative father). 
6 Family Law Quarterly 10:262 (1976). 
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Some of the factors. given in Table 9 are not tested in practice. The 
reason is clear: several of them ·ce.g., AK, G-6-PD, Hb, PGD) are poor 
discriminators and a greater number of tests allows more room for mis-
classification errors (Chakraborty, et al. 1974). These tests have low 
(average) probabilities of exclusion, but there are measures for use in 
selecting tests that are somewhat more appropriate for the analysis we 
have described. For a man selected randomly from the population, it is 
a trivial calculation to show that the expected value of his paternity 
index is 1 regardless of the number of gene systems involved. This is 
true whether or not the -child/mother phenotypic combination is given. 
(A corollary is that the expected posterior odds of paterni-ty is the prior 
odds.) Systems should be chosen if for that system the paternity index of 
a randomly selected man has substantial variability--measured, say, by 
its standard deviation. 
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The standard deviation of the system P.I. depends on the child's 
and mother's phenotypes. Table 11 provides an example using the ABO system 
and the white California population discussed in Section 2. Since these 
phenotypes are, of course, not available before deciding which systems to 
test, the unconditional standard deviation is required. The variance of 
P.I. can be calculated by averaging the conditional variances over the 
distribution of the various child/mother combinations since the mean P.I. 
is constant. For the example of Table 11 the requisite distribution is 
given in Table 4; the (average) variance is 0.700 and standard deviation is 
0.837. Only systems with sufficiently large standard deviations of their 
P •. L, say at least 0. 5, should be tested. If, .jaY, 12 blood group systems 
are used and all have standard deviation 0.5, then the standard deviation of 
the P. I. is only /c1 + (0.5) 2)12 - 1 = 3. 7. On the other hand, if the 
individual standard deviations are 1 then the overall standard deviation is 
64. The latter case not only provides a much better chance for exclusion, 
but also will yield a much larger probability of paternity for a man who 
is not excluded. 
Table 11: Estimates of Standard Deviation of Random 
Paternity Index (White California Popula-
tion) 
Child/Mother Standard Deviation Child/Mother Standard Deviation 
Phenotypes of Random P. I. Phenotypes of Random P.I. 
0/0 0.443 0/B 0.445 
A/0 1.230 A/B 1~229 
.. ·- . .., B/B 0.410 B/0 2.282 
AB/0 AB/B 1.·235 
0/A 0.445 0/AB 
A/A 0.283 A/AB 0.209 
B/A 2.297 B/AB 0.356 
AB/A 2.277 AB/AB 0.997 
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. ,; l Probability of Patemity Based on Nonexclusion 
An analysis using Bayes's theorem applied to exclusion/nonexclusion has 
been suggested by many authors; e.g., Lee (1975), Wiener (1976). For 
example, given that a man has not been excluded but 90% of all men would be 
excluded, the posterior odds of paternity are nine times the prior odds. Such 
inferences are weaker than the approaca described earlier because they are 
based on a reductioµ of the data. 
Sometimes this reduction is substantial. Suppose mother and child 
have type A blood. Then there is no information in the fact that an alleged 
father.is not excluded: the prior odds·of paternity would ~e unchanged· 
because no men are excluded. However, the P.I. varies in wh'ite Califomi~ns 
from 0.44 (odds of patemity decreased) for type B men to 1.32 (odds 
increased) for type A men. For a nonexcluded man the odds of paternity 
would usually increase if full information is used; it would be a.mistake 
for the counsel of the alleged father to object to this approach in favor 
of the one described earlier! 
§5. Discussion and Reco11D11endations 
There are a number of important issues thatwe have not resolved. 
How accurate are blood tests? What effect do inaccuracies· have? How 
are prior probabilities assessed? Who does the assessing? How does one 
combine genetic and other evidence? These are among the questions considered 
in this section. In addition, questions for expert witnesses and effective 
communication of these issues to a jury are discussed. 
The Role of Probabilities in Law 
Should courts be guided to a posterior probability of paternity, or 
probability of guilt in criminal cases? Fairley (1973) presents arguments 
for both sides. He also describes a study that shows unaided intuition to 
be inept in learning from probabilistic evidence. While the case for formal 
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analysis, administered with appropriate qualifiers, seems strong, it assumes 
that probability does have a role in law. 
Ellman and Kaye (1979) argue for·the appropriate use of probabilistic 
evidence in legal cases. They indicate that many people view such evidence 
as being comparable to Rabelais's Judge Bridlegoose who rolled dice to de-
cide cases, the higher roll winning. We agree with them that a decision 
based on an assessed probability is not a randomized decision. The dis-
tinction is between constructing dice to specifications and actually roll-
ing them. 
Courts ·frequently decide cases in which they·are uncertain about 
the correct disposition. In giving his reasons for rolling dice to his 
peers, Judge Bridlegoose repeatedly says that he throws dice "just like 
you other gentlemen." This repetition--the phrase occurs in practically 
every sentence--suggests that Rabelais was convinced that an element of 
randomness is present in all court decisions. Judge Bridlegoose had 
the advantage over his peers in knowing which dice he used in each 
case! "It took the testimony of a sage, an oracle, a drunken party goer, 
a messenger, a sheepherder and his own wife before Oedipus could figure out 
who his father was." (New York Times, June 1981, as quoted by Schatkin 
(1984, p. 8-29)). Modern paternity cases offer little good evidence of a 
nature other than probabilistic. 
Blood Tests and Other Evidence: Assessing Priors 
Defining a probability of paternity on the basis of genetic testing 
alone is like assigning a probability to the proposition that a coin is 
fair using the results of several tosses of the coin. There is no 
logical foundation for an assignment based solely on the data, but 
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5 people try to do it nonetheless. 
A mistake made in the literature and practice of genetic· testing 
for paternity is easy to identify. The entire discipline recognizes 
that Bayes's .theorem must be applied, but some paternity testers 
5 The following quote from Schatkin (1984, preface pp. 809) is given 
without comment. 
As a rule, one hundred blood tests will result in some fifteen 
exclusions. Multiplying IS by 2 (because the blood test potential for 
exonerating an innocent man is about SS per cent.) in that serie_s of 
one hundred blood tests carried out, 30 per cent. are actually not the 
fathers. Falling back on the an~logy of a woman putting her hand 
into an urn and making her selection of whom to accuse, the thirty 
innocent men in that series represent a wrong guess on her part and 
a gamble on her part that failed. Blood test exclusions, therefore, · 
demonstrate those cases where the woman .. guessed wrong." 
As stated, l 5 exclusions result from 100 blood tests carried out, 
and of those 100 men, 30 are actually not the fathers. And, 85 are 
not excluded. And of those 85 not excluded, we know that 15 are not 
the father. So that, what are the probabilities of one of those 85 
actualJy being the father? We divide 85 by JS. Therefore the chances 
of one of those men not excluded being the actual father, is in the 
proportion of 5 ½ to 1. We conclude, therefore, that if a man is not 
excluded, the chances are 5 to 1 that he is the father of the child. 
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(apparently dating to Essen-M"oller (1938)) want to use the same prior 
probability in every case! Namely, they assume that, aside from the 
genetic data, the alleged father is the true father with probability 1/2. 
From our personal experience we know of one pathologist who testified in 
court that the probability, or "plausibility", of paternity does not 
depend on the number of men who had sexual intercourse with the mother 
near the time of conception. In fact, a candidate for the p~ior proba-
bility for an alleged father is the number of times he had intercourse 
with the mother near the time of conception divided by the total number 
of times she had intercourse in that period. (This could be refined to 
take into account more likely times for conception, viability of the man's 
spearm, etc.) But this information is known only to the mother and even 
she may have forgotten. In assessing a prior probability a j.uror :.must 
digest a variety of conflicting testimony concerning this and other issues. 
There may be cases in which some jurors actually have a prior prob-
ability of 1/2. But introducing it in court under the guise of blood 
typing is grossly misleading unless the implications are made clear. 
Ideally, each juror should appraise the information, other than the blood 
typing data, in the case at hand and assess a prior probability on that 
basis. They can then be told how to transform it into posterior prob-
abilities and in turn use it to reach a verdict. 
The posterior probability of paternity, say n', is a function of the 
prior, say n : namely, 
n' = [1+ _1_ 1-n J-1 P.I. n , 
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where P.I. = paternity index. Of course, judges and juries will have 
trouble with such a formula. But it can be tabled, and the table can include 
the traditional n= 1/2. Table 12 provides an example using Mr. 1 's 
P.I. = 125 found in Table 9. It also gives the prior and posterior odds. 
against paternity since some people think in those terms rather than in 
probabilities. 
Table 12: Prior to Posterior Probabilities of Paternity for P. I. c 125 
Prior .. 1 1 1 1 1 _L 0 1,000,000 1,000 :_100 10 2 10 1 Probability n 
Posterior 0 0.00012 0.111 0.558 0.933 0.992 0.999 1 Probability n' 
Prior odds 00 999,999:1 999:1 
against 
·99:1 9:1 1:1 1:9 0 
Posterior 00 8000:1 8:1 4:5 1:14 l:124 1:999 0 
odds against 
There are several substantive problems with this "ideal". One is that the 
juror may refuse to quantifynongenetic information in terms of a probability, 
or even a range of probabilities. The juror can be asked to interpret 
probabilities in terms of small-stake bets, or betting odds. And many 
jurors will go along willingly. But some may have an aversion, ~oral 
or otherwise, to betting. It may help to indicate that these are only 
thought bets or preferences designed to quantify strength of belief. 
(For related ideas see DeGroot (1970, Chapter 6).) 
Some care in advising a jury in the matter of assigning a prior prob-
ability is necessary because the best mode of elicitation-dialogue--is not 
available. On the other hand, a high degree of precision is not necessary; 
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only a gross assessment of magnitude is needed. Bets or lotteries can be 
described which will help a juror decide on a range of prior prob-
abilities. For example, the jury can be told: "If you would prefer being 
paid $1 if this man is not the father to $1 if he is, then your prior prob-
ability of paternity is less than 1/2. If, in addition, you would prefer $1 
if this man is the father to $1 if a "1" is rolled on a fair die then it is 
greater than 1/6. A range of prior probabilities corresponds to a range 
of posterior probabilities as exemplified in Table 12. These bounds on the 
posterior probability may be sufficient ·to determine the juror's vote--in 
any event it will help. This suggests a method for setting up an analog of 
Table 12. The prior probabilities tabled ca~ be calculated to correspond 
to some interesting posteriors probabilities; e.g., 0.99, 0.95, 0.90, 0.50. 
The above discussion assumes that jurors are willing to assess prior 
probability distributions. While little can be done if they have no feeling 
for randomness, there are various devices that may help. One is as follows. 
They can be asked to suppose that the proportion of the time the mother had 
sexual intercourse with the alleged father, as opposed to other men, during 
the time in which conception was possible were known. Then this could serve 
as a prior probability. Since it is not known, relevant testimony can be 
weighed. If a juror can be made to assess a probability distribution on 
this proportion ("How likely do you feel this proportion is less than 10%?" 
Etc.) then Table 12 can be used with n equal to the mean of this distribu-
tion. The values n =O and n = 1 are important in this regard for they cor-
respond to frequently heard testimony: namely, "never had intercourse with 
her" and "no other man". For example, if these latter are the only two 
possibilities, and are given equal weight by the juror, then the colunm 
n c 1/2 in the analog of Table 12 is appropriate. 
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The most serious difficulty in assessing a prior probability of 
paternity is setting the genetic information aside to ensure that it is, 
in effect, not used twice in evaluating a posterior probability. It 
would help if blood group and other genetic data were presented subse-
quent to all other evidence, ~ut it can never be kept completely separate! 
That a case comes to trial almost always implies that the alleged father 
was not excluded, so "nonexclusion" is, in the broad sense, used twice. 
The double usage of this evidence can have an enormous impact on a jury. 
(Our experience is that cases that go to court are almost always decided for 
the plaintiff when the alleged fnther has a high paternity index and acknow-
ledges intercourse with the mother .!!_ ~~~ time, though not necessarily rdur-
ing the time that conception was possible--Schatk.in (1984) gives many case 
histories.) 
One remedy is to calculate a paternity index conditionally on the 
fact that the man was not excluded. This would be easy to do and would 
result in substantially lower P.I.s for nonexcluded men. Such an 
adjustment is appropriate and seems essential if justice is to be served. 
The following recommendation by Wiener (1976) is related to this 
double usage: "The value of [the.!. priori probability of paternity] 
depends on the experience of the courts--e.g., if 75 percent of the 
defendants have been found innocent of the charge then the a priori probability 
of paternity ••• is 0.75 (sic; he meant 0.25)." There are a number of serious 
objections to this proposal. One is that the nonexclusion of the alleged father 
is used twice in an obviously formal way (while true for the use of Bayes's 
theorem with a paternity index, this is especially clear in Wiener's context 
because he goes on to use Bayes's.theorem conditioning on nonexclusion). As stated 
previously, prior probabilities should depend only on the particulars of 
the case at hand but not on any blood typing data that will be presented in 
evidence. 
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What Reference Population? 
The paternity index depends heavily on the reference population used. 
A common practice of laboratories is .to use the genetic frequencies in the 
race of the alleged father to calculate the patemity index. The logic for 
this is difficult to comprehend; the calculation is appropriate only if .the 
true father is of the same race. As indicated in the example of the pre-
vious section, the resulting bias can be substantial. While not perfect, 
it would be much more appropriate to use the race of the child. If the 
race of the true father is an issue in a particular case, then the P.I. 
should be calculated by averaging over the local population. Alternatively, 
if the alleged father is white, say, and the defense claims the true father 
is black, then different sets of calculations should be made. The jury 
can decide which to believe, or. how to weight them. 
An obvious difficulty in making calculations for "the correct" ref-
erence population is the lack of appropriate data. Suppose a woman becomes 
pregnant in a small secluded town in which there are few families, some 
inbreeding,. and, little genetic variation. Using the population of the 
entire country as the reference set is obviously inappropriate. In parti-
cular, the proportion of the town's population excluded by blood tests 
would likely be much smaller than the proportion of the larger population 
that would be excluded. 
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Blood group data in a case alleging incest need not be handled 
differently from any other paternity .case. Calculating the likelihood of 
the alleged father depends only on the three blood samples, and the fact 
that the mother's and alleged father's genetic structures are similar is 
of no additional consequence. But the likelihood of the "random man" is 
greatly affected if a suspected alternative to the alleged father is re-
lated to the mother or the alleged father, whether or not the latter two 
are themselves related. This information would be easy to incorporate if 
the blood groups of any such alternatives are known, and extremely difficult 
if not. Men whose :identities are known can be regarded as "random", but 
not if they are related to the mother or alleged father. 
Errors in Testing: Other Realities 
The analysis of the preceding section assumed that tests for genetic 
factors are -error-free. Chakraborty, et al. (1974) cite studies showing 
that "misclassifications insofar as the blood groups are concerned are 
more common than generally acknowledged and even in highly reputable lab-
oratories may involve 2% - 3% of all determinations." This has an effect 
on the paternity index and in turn on the probability of paternity. While 
not done in practice, error rates could easily be incorporated: the genetic 
evidence can be given in terms of a probability distribution which in-
corporates the possibility of error, and likelihoods can be calculated on 
this basis. Not explicitly considering misclassification errors encourages 
a court to lend more credence to the report from a laboratory than is 
justified. 
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The possibility of misclassification errors means, of course, that no 
man is excluded with certainty--only with high probability. For example, 
assuming a 2% error rate in ABO classification, Mr. 4 would not have been 
excluded in Section 3. Table 13 revises Table 6 assuming a 2% error rate 
in the blood tests of the possible fathers (mother and child are both 
assumed to be type 0-the error possibilities in their tests would make for 
still-less change in the probabilities from prior to posterior). 
Table 13: Table 6 Modifi~d by 2% Classification Error Rate 
Statement s1 s2 s3 s4 ss s6 
, 
Probability 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 1/6 Prior to E 
Likelihood 0.988 0.439 0.476 0.014 0.988 0.439 Pr(Elsi) 
Probability 0.295 0.131 0.142 0.004 0.295 0.131 Posterior to E 
In general, the greater the possibility of classification error, the 
closer a paternity index is to 1. This means that men who are not excluded 
as father will tend to have smaller probabilities of paternity, and men 
who are "excluded" will tend to have greater probabilities. 
In the words of Wiener (1976), " ••• researchers have had occasion to 
retest and have detected errors in more than a score of cases. 
If the newer tests {new blood groups] are included, the possibility of error 
will, of course, be multiplied, especially because many of the newer tests 
are not perfected." And," ••• as the number of tests increase ••• a 
point will be reached at which the chances of exclusion increase more slowly 
even th$n the chances of error and where further testing is extravagantly 
costly • • ·" 
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The better laboratories recognize the possibility of error and do 
all tests in duplicate and some in triplicate, '(l!o.lesJty 1975, p. 89). 
Assuming the individual tests are independent--even though technicians 
are blinded, this assumption may not be entirely valid--the error rate is 
substantially reduced. Presumably they report the mode in case of disagree-
ment. The actual policy in these matters should be made public. But more 
importantly, all results (three, if triplicate) should be presented in court. 
Requesting all the data wou~d be an appropriate tool for a lawyer whose 
case is suffering. While this information may tend to obscure matters 
for a judge or jury, it is necessary for completeness. Withholding such 
information creates an illusion of precision that may be unwarranted. 
(The situation is analogous to that of an experimenter who makes observations 
in triplicate and uses only their means or medians in a regression problem, 
an all too common practice--R2 will be artificially inflated.) 
(Blood tests are highly respected as evidence by the legal profession. 
For example, in a chapter entitled The Unerring Accuracy of Blood Tests, 
Schatkin (1984, p. 11-1) displays a rather curious logic to come to the 
following conclusion. 
Verification of the accuracy of blood tests came not long after their 
inception. During the ten-year period March 22, 1935 to March 22, 
1945, 656 blood tests carried out in affiliation cases by order of the 
Court of Special Sessions in New York City resulted in 65 ex~lusions. 
The question naturally arises, Were those exclusions accurate?. The 
answer is Yes, because each and every one of those 65 exclusions was 
· followed by the mother's subsequent confession, for the first time, of 
sexual relations with another man about the time she became preg-
nant. 
Actually, the information given is also consistent with every blood test 
being wrong!) 
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There are other errors which enter into the calculation of a pater-
nity index that should be mentioned. One form of error is statistical. 
The phenotypic frequencies used are based on sawples an~ not complete 
population counts. Some laboratories use published frequencies while some 
others, notably blood banks, keep records of previous blood samples tested. 
Fo~ example, the estimates used in Table 9 were reported by Grunbaum, 
et al. (1978) and were based on blood samples of 6004 white and l024 black 
Californians that were collected from blood banks around ·the state. 
Assuming these are representative of Californians (a dubious assumption!), 
the standard errors in estimating the percentage of O alleles in the white 
and black population to be 0.692 and 0.690 are 0.6% and 1.4%. So a 95% 
confidence interval for the proportion of O all among black Californians 
is 66.2 to 71.8%. Of course, the smaller the sample size, the larger the 
standard error of the estimate. 
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The next point seems minor and it seems difficult to deal with in the 
courtroom. More than one laboratory in the United States carries out 
calculations of likelihood ratios, and presents them in court, using 
six-digit accuracy; for example, a paternity index of 51.3204 (translating 
to a plausibility of paternity of 98.089%). In view of the presence of the 
above errors, calculations reported to more than 2 digits are suspect. They 
do not deceive educated observers but, again, they can create an illusion of 
great accuracy in court. A lawyer may question the accuracy of ·the numbers, 
but even if the paternity testei recants and, in the above example, says 
.... 
P.I~ =51, the plausibility of paternity is essentially unch~nged. The en-
deavor can be perceived as inconsequential and unnecessary carping to a Jury. 
Even the three-digit accuracy reported in Table 9 is misleading. 
(We note that the frequency of AK. in blacks was reported to one-digit 
accuracy. This alone makes the reported paternity index of 8100 subject to 
an error of up to 500.) Suppose the relative error in each of the 12 gene 
system likelihood ratios is 2%. Then the relative error in the product 
of the 12 is 
or about ill as large, so an error of 15% is quite possible. 
Additional Genetic Evidence 
A posterior probability of paternity can change in two ways: through 
the prior and through the paternity index. We have discussed the prior and 
the denominator of the paternity index (which is affected by the choice 
of reference population) previously. The P.I. also depends on the probability 
of the child's phenotypic structure given the mother's and assuming the 
alleged father is the father. This likelihood can be changed--perhaps to 
exclude a previously nonexcluded man--by gathering more data. 
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There is no universal standard that indicates· whid.h blood groiJp,,systems 
to use in calculating a particular paternity index. Some limit on the num-
ber used is necessary to help ensure independence, minimize errors, and keep 
costs down. But clearly an alleged father who knows he cannot be the father 
should ask for replicate testing and testing on further systems until he is 
excluded. On the other hand, a mother who is certain that the father is a 
man who has been excluded should ask for retesting because either a mistake 
has been made or a "silent" gene is involved. In certain codominant systems, 
when it happens that the mother and child are both homozygous for the same 
allele and apparently the father lacks that allele and so is judged to be 
homozygous for the second dominant allele, he is excluded. In this case the 
man may not be homozygous but actually have a "silent" recessive gene which 
is not detectable by the standard test so that the exclusion is false. The 
frequency of such a gene in the serum protein haptoglobin system is reported 
by Cook, et al. (1969). Competent facilities take this into account in 
their reports (Dodd and Lincoln 1981). 
Another way of gathering additional relevant data without testing more 
factors is to test relatives of the mother and alleged father. For example, 
in Section 3, Mr. 2 could father a type O child with a type O mother only 
if his genotype is AO. So if it were determined that his true parents were 
both AB then he would be exonerated. Still relevant, though not conclusive, 
·would be evidence that his other n children with a type O mother were type A. 
The likelihood that he is AA for this latter set of data is 1 and the likeli-
hood of AO is only (l/2)n. On the other hand, if one of his parents or one 
of his other were type O then his genotype is in fact AO and his P.I. would 
increase somewhat. 
Other kinds of genetic evidence that have been used in paternity cases 
are less accurate measures of heredity but are much better understood by 
lay ,people: hair color, eye color, "family resemblance", etc. Incorporating 
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this information into the P.I. is difficult but incorporating it into the 
prior is possible.· For example, if both the mother and the alleged father 
are blue-eyed and devoid of any brown pigment in their irises but the child is 
definitely brown-eyed, the alleged father is excludable. On the other hand, 
.a devastating impact can be made on a jury when a mother presents her red-
headed child in court and the nonexcluded alleged father also has red hair. 
Still, cautious lawyers will often balk at exhibiting a child in court because 
of the poor µnderstanding people have of these easily observed hereditary traits. 
Questions for a Geneticist or Pathologist in Court 
A number of substantive issues have been raised in this paper conceming 
the way in which genetic information is used in paternity cases. Many of 
these issues should be exposed in court. We present a few sample questions 
for a geneticist here. These may aid an attorney in preparing a case or 
a geneticist in critically rethinking an analysis; they also serve as a 
review for this paper. 
Question: How were the blood factors you analyzed chosen? 
Discussion: Presumably, factors were chosen if their phenotypes could be 
classified reliably and if they were discriminatory (having a high exclusion 
frequency). Also, tests are time-consuming so some limit is necessary. 
Question: Do you always analyze these same factors? 
Discussion: A negative answer -can be embarrassing, especially if some factors 
were not tested in the present case that had been in others. For then the 
obvious question is, 





Question: Are there still other factors that you have never used that might 
have excluded him? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: Do the calculations you made assume that the various blood 
factors are independent? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: Are they independent? 
Discussion: There is no way for someone to know the answer a priori. If 
the answer is "yes" documentation should be requested. The paper by 
Grunbaum, et al. (1978) mentioned previously provides limited documentation 
on the 12 factors given in Table 9--"limited" to pairwise independence and 
Californians. 
Question: What is the rate of classification error in your methods? 
Discussion: :.Possibleanswer: Less than 3% for an individual test, but 
we do all tests in triplicate with three different analysts so the chance 
for error is negligible. (Some geneticists claim a very small error rate; 
documentation should be requested.) 
Question: What do you do when the analysts disagree? 
Discussion: If the answer is "we take the mode" then there is still a 
substantial chance for error. Possible answer: We retest until we are 
virtually certain of the result. 
Question: What effect does the possibility of error have on the paternity index? 
Discussion: The issue is very complicated. If substantial retesting is done 
to eliminate errors then the effect may be negligible. 
Question: Were there any disagreements in any of the tests in the current 
case? 
Discussion: Probable answer: I don't know. 
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Question: How accurate are the estimates o_f the phenotypic frequencies 
of the factors you used? 
Answer: They are based on thousands o~ samples and so are accurate to within 
2%. 
Question: What effect can these errors have on the paternity index? 
Answer: It could change it by 10-20% but it could not have excluded an alleged 
father whose P.I. is positive. 
Question: How did you calculate the probability (or plausibility) of 
paternity in this cas~? 
Discussion: The answer is bound to be long, involve references to formulas 
and computers and include phrases like "standard practice in the field". 
It is quite unlikely that any juror will understand the answer. The answer 
may be couched in terms of frequency-based probabilities ("Take the ratio 
o·f 125, the P. I., to 125 plus 1 for a random man and express it as a percent.") 
which will also suggest that the respondent does not really understand the 
meaning of a probability of paternity. 
Question: Does this probability depend on whether or not the mother and 
alleged father had sexual intercourse proximate to the time of conception? 
Discussion: Seemingly a silly question, but it is difficult to give a correct, 
extended answer. Obviously, it is not possible for the alleged father to be 
the father unless intercourse occurred near the. time of conception. But a 
juror's prior probability should weigh the various possibilities in this re-
gard. Then the posterior probability also weighs these possibilities-as 
they should. Put another way, a juror's probability of patemity is an 
average_ of two conditional probabilities, one assumes intercourse and the 
other does not (obviously, the latter is zero). 
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Question: Would this probability change if it were known that the alleged 
father and a number of other men had intercourse with the mother near the time 
of conception? 
Answer: Yes. If the proportion of the time intercourse involved the alleged 
father is 1/n then on the basis of this information the odds against the 
alleged father are increased by the factor n- 1 and there is a corresponding 
decrease in the probability of paternity. 
Question: Under these conditions, what value of n would make the alleged 
father an even bet to be the father? 
Answer: h = P. I., the paternity index. 
Question: What would be the effect on the posterior probability if it were 
known that one of the other men who had intercourse with the mother was a 
relative of the alleged father? 
Answer: Then the calculation of the posterior probability is wrong. If, for 
example, the relative was his identical twin then both would have the same 
P.I. and, assuming equal frequency of intercourse, the same posterior 
probability which means it can be no greater than 50%. 
§6. Other Available Teats and the Horizon 
One of the great advantages of genetic testing for paternity is the 
potential savings in time, effort and money--especially in regard to 
litigation. Excluded fathers are rarely if ever these days, brought to 
trial by a plaintiff, and on the other hand when the true father is 
confronted with overwhelming genetical evidence as to his paternity, he 
might well accept the responsibility. Hence as a practical matter genetic 
testing becomes a reasonable and relatively inexpensive way to clear court 
dockets. It also serves to reduce welfare costs for the increasing ntllllber 
of children born out of wedlock since the father can be compelled to pay 
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child support. 
Few courts have been hesitant to accept red blood cell antigen testing 
(Schatkin 1984). When this series fails to exclude, a resolution ~y be 
attempted using red blood cell and serum proteins or HLA typing; which one 
is used depends on state laws and the usual procedure of the laboratory 
concerned. 
In discussing the admissibility of HLA testing, the Kansas Court of 
Appeals6 notes that 
••since HLA testing is a relatively new test insofar as its use in the 
courtroom is concerned, it has been dealt with by only a few appellate 
courts. Several courts have refused to admit the test to show probability 
of paternity. In so doing, however these courts have in general acknowl-
edged the test as reliable but 11evertheless rejected the evidence under 
. specific statutes which limit admissJ"bility of blood test results to those 
which exclude the alleged father. 
6Tice v •. Richardson, 8 F.L.R. 1113. Quoted from (Schatkin 1984, p. 3-28). 
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The value of an HLA test, though considerably more expensive to admin-
ister, lies in the large number of alleles, resulting in a much higher ex-
clusion probability. It is also claimed (Perdue, et al. 1977) that the error 
rate of HLA typing classifications in pairs of replicate typing tests is 
less than 0.35% when performed under very carefully controlled conditions. 
The probability of exclusion for the HLA system alone is claimed to be 0.95 
(Sussman and Gilja 1981). They also report that a total probability of ex-
clusion of 0.9995 is available when red blood cell antigens and enzymes and 
serum proteins are used in conjunction with HLA. 
A new potentially rich source of polymorphisms based on recombinant 
DNA technology is described by Botstein, et al. (1980). Suggestions are 
made that could eventually lead to a human genetic linkage map which would 
considerably elucidate modes of inheritance. The new markers are called 
restriction ~~agment length polymorphisms (RFLP) and can be assayed from 
small amounts of peripheral blood and, according to some, appear-to be in-
herited as simple Mendelian codominant--alleles. we-may··expect ·that the~. 
development, perfection, and use of this rich new source of genotypic dif-
ferences could eventually lead to a probability of excluding an innocent 
man that, for all intents and purposes, is one. Of course it is not clear 
when such a goal will become a reality. In the meantime, since juridicial 
decisions cannot be put off, forensic statisticians can be of much service 
to litigants and the court by constantly probing assumptions, scrutinizing 
techniques, assessing the accuracy of results, examining the data closely, 
and providing a coherent framework for decision making. 
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